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ARGUMENT 
VJJ The contentions raised by Defendant-Appellee The Kroger Company, doing 
business as Smith's Pharmacy #40063 ("Smith's Pharmacy" or "the Pharmacy") and 
~ Defendant-Appellee Gregory P. Tayler, M.D. (the "Doctor" or "Dr. Tayler") are not 
well taken, for the following reasons: 
First, contrary to the assertions by Smith's Pharmacy and Dr. Tayler, the 
issues that this Court has called upon the parties to address were in fact preserved in 
and addressed by the District Court and Court of Appeals. 
Second, it remains clear that the Court of Appeals' decision affirming the 
District Court's application of Rule 26( d)( 4) to exclude an expert report that was 
untimely under a Stipulation adopted by the Court as the source of the applicable 
deadline conflicts with this Court's decision in Coro/es v. State, 2015 UT 48, 349 
P.3d 739. 
Third, even ifRule 26( d)( 4) were the proper source for imposition of sanctions 
in the situation presented here, the Court of Appeals' interpretation of Rule 26(d)(4) 
to require only a showing of a lack of justification conflicts with the plain language 
of Rule 26(d)(4) and well-settled interpretations of the analogous Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure. 
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I. PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUES THAT THIS COURT CALLED 
UPON THE PARTIES TO ADDRESS. 
The issues presented here concerning the District Court's exclusion of the 
expert report that was prepared by a pharmacologist and filed with the Court were 
presented to the District Court, decided by the District Court, and addressed by the 
Court of Appeals. The preservation of those issues applies with equal force to the 
Doctor, because, though a separate expert report as to Dr. Tayler was not prepared G 
or filed, the expert report by the pharmacologist would be admissible on remand to 
evaluate the standard of care and causation as applied to the Doctor. 
A. PRESERVATION AS TO THE PHARMACY. 
Smith's Pharmacy contends (Phann. Br. at 32-49)1 that Ms. Baumann did not 
preserve, before the District Court, the two issues that this Court asked the parties 
to address in its October 3 1, 2016 Order granting Ms. Baumann' s Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari: ( 1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the District 
Court properly applied Rule 26( d)( 4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, rather than 
Rule 16( d), to its determination of the appropriate sanction for Petitioners failure to G 
timely disclose her pharmacologist-expert's report; and (2) whether the Court of 
Appeals erred in concluding the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
1 Citations in this form refer to the "Brief of Appellee The Kroger Company 
dba Smith's Pharmacy #40063 ('Smith's Pharmacy')" filed with this Court in this 
appeal. 
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precluding Petitioner from using her pharmacologist-expert's testimony to contest 
summary judgment. The Pharmacy is mistaken. 
Under the general preservation rule, "generally an appellant must properly 
viJ preserve an issue in the district court before it will be reviewed on appeal." 0 'Dea 
v. Olea, 2009 UT 46, 1 15, 217 P.3d 704; accord Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 
68, 1 12, 266 P.3d 828. To satisfy this requirement, the issue must have been 
"'presented to the district court in such a way that the court has an opportunity to 
rule on [it]."' Patterson, 2011 UT 68, 112 (quotingJ.M W. v. T.I.Z. (In Re Adoption 
of Baby E.Z.), 2011 UT 38,125, 266 P.3d 702). 
In light of these principles, it is clear that the Ms. Baumann properly preserved 
the issue of whether the District Court should consider her untimely expert report 
when it decided the Defendant-Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment. In fact, 
JJ during the second hearing on the Motion, Ms. Baumann argued, among other points, 
that the Court should decide summary judgment based on the complete record that 
she had submitted, the decision of the SSA, and the report of the expert witness that 
she had filed and served, not based on a procedural error on her part.2 Ms. Baumann 
2 The January 5, 2015 hearing was not the first time that Ms. Baumann had 
raised the issue. On November 17, 2014, Ms. Baumann had filed a document 
entitled "Request for Admission of Plaintiffs URCP 26 Expert Report" and a copy 
of the report of her expert. Then, on December 15, 2015, Ms. Baumann filed a 
document entitled "Motion to Admit Plaintiffs Expert Witness Report." Rec. at 
395. In that Motion, Ms. Baumann asked the District Court to consider and not 
(continued ... ) 
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also made clear that her failure to disclose an expert and then her untimely disclosure 
of an expert were not intentional. See Rec. at 486 [15:1-18:3 and 22:2-25] 
( transcript attached as Addendum C to Appellant's opening Brief). Counsel for the 
Pharmacy, in tum, argued that the District Court should not consider any expert 
report filed after October 8, 2014. Id. [4:19-6:1]. 
The District Court then specifically ruled on the issues presented here. In 
particular, at the close of the hearing, the Court decided it would not consider expert 
reports submitted after the deadline contained in the Stipulation for Additional Time 
to Conduct Standard Discovery. Rec. at 486 [23:12-24:19] (transcript attached as 
Addendum C to Appellant's opening Brief). Finally, in its written decision granting 
the Motion, which was prepared as a proposed order by counsel for the Defendants- <v· 
Appellees, the District Court specifically ruled as follows concerning 
Ms. Baumann' s request to consider her untimely expert report that had been filed 
with the Court and served on counsel for Defendants-Appellees: 
[T]he Court finds that Plaintiff failed to make expert disclosures as 
required by the Stipulation for Additional Time to Conduct Standard 
Discovery and Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and that 
2( ••• continued) 
exclude the expert report that she had filed. Then, on January 5, 2015, Ms. Baumann 
filed a document entitled "Plaintiff's Statement for Continuation Opposing 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Exclusion of Evidence." Rec. at 
459. In that document, which the Court identified as one that it considered in 
granting the Motion, Ms. Baumann likewise argued against exclusion of the expert 
report. See Rec. at 587. 
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there is no good cause for Plaintiff's failure to make expert disclosures. 
Therefore, Plaintiff was precluded by Rule 26( d)( 4) from using any 
undisclosed witness, document, or material in opposition to the Motion 
for Summary Judgment filed by the Defendants. 
Rec. at 528-27 ( decision attached as Addendum B to Appellant's opening Briet).3 
It follows from all of this that the precise issues presented here were actually 
presented to the District Court in such a way that the District Court had an 
~ opportunity to and did in fact rule on it. Accordingly, in this situation, it is clear that 
the issue was properly preserved for consideration by this Court. See, e.g., 
Patterson, 2011 UT 68, 1 12. In the end, the Pharmacy's effort to fabricate a 
fictional scenario in which the issues presented here were not preserved is simply 
unavailing. 
Against all this, the Pharmacy repeatedly contends (Phann. Br. at 36-37 and 
42-43) that the District Court did not "exclude" Ms. Baumann's untimely expert 
report in deciding the motion for summary judgment. In reality, the Pharmacy is 
3 The Pharmacy is plainly wrong when it asserts (Pharm. Br. at 4) that, in our 
opening Brief in this appeal, we did not provide sufficient citation to the record at 
which the issues presented here had been preserved. In reality, in the Statement of 
the Issues presented in our opening Brief (at 1-2 and 35), we cite to both the 
presentation made by Ms. Baumann during oral argument on the Motion for 
Summary Judgment; to the decision by the District Court in which it specifically 
decided that it would not consider the untimely report, also with citations to the 
record; and to the opinion of the Court of Appeals in which it likewise addressed the 
issues presented here. Then, in the Statement of Facts in our opening Brief 
( at 10-12), we again demonstrate the fact that Ms. Baumann presented the issues to 
the District Court and that the District Court actually ruled specifically on the issues 
presented here. 
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playing semantic games when it asserts that the District Court did not "exclude" 
Ms. Baumann' s untimely expert report because, the Pharmacy says, she never sought 
leave to file the report and it was filed after the close of expert discovery under the 
stipulation of the parties that was adopted by the Court as a scheduling order. The 
Pharmacy's attempt to create a distinction is unsupportable and unavailing. In 
reality, Ms. Baumann repeatedly asked the Court to consider the expert report and, 
in deciding the Motion for Summary Judgment, the District Court explicitly declined 
to consider the report actually filed and served by Ms. Baumann. In so doing, the 
District Court in fact exclude her untimely report from consideration on the Motion. 
The Pharmacy's argument to the contrary is nothing short of fanciful. 
B. PRESERVATION AS TO THE DOCTOR. 
The Doctor contends (Dr. Br. at 9-12)4 that Ms. Baumann did not preserve 
before the District Court the issue whether she should have been permitted to submit 
an expert report, whether timely or not, as to Dr. Tayler. This contention is accurate. 
As to Dr. Tayler, Ms. Baumann did not submit and seek in the District Court to rely 
on a separate expert report that specifically addressed the standard of care applicable 
to the Doctor or the issue of causation.5 Accordingly, Ms. Baumann did not seek, in 
4 Citations in this form refer to the Brief of Defendant / Appellee Gregory P. 
Tayler, M.D. filed with this Court in this appeal. 
5 As noted in our principal Brief (at 10), on November 12, 2014, five days 61 
(continued ... ) 
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her Petition for Writ of Certiorari, to obtain review by this Court whether the District 
Court and, in tum, the Court of Appeals erred in excluding such a report. 
That, however, does not end the inquiry as to the Doctor's potential liability 
in the event that this Court reverses the District Court's decision to exclude the 
expert report that Ms. Baumann did file and serve in opposition to the Defendants' 
joint motion for summary judgment. It is wrong to suggest, as the Doctor does (Dr. 
Br. at 15-16), that the expert the expert report filed and served by Ms. Baumann is 
limited to consideration of liability on the part of the Pharmacy alone. Rather, the 
pharmacologist-expert offered expert opinions about the dangers of prescribing the 
duplicative medications; and whether the Pharmacy breached the applicable standard 
of care by prescribing the duplicative medications, instructed Ms. Baumann to take 
the duplicative medications just as prescribed by Dr. Tayler, and failed to warn her 
~ that they were duplicative drugs or that there were any special risks associated with 
taking the duplicative drugs in the dosages prescribed. See Rec. at 3 83-81; and 
5( ••• continued) 
before oral argument on the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Ms. Baumann provided counsel for the Doctor and the Pharmacy with an expert 
report and curriculum vitae applicable to the alleged breaches and failures by the 
Pharmacy. On November 15, 2014, Ms. Baumann also filed the same expert report 
in response to the Reply Memorandum filed by Defendants-Appellees and also a 
request to the Court to admit the report in response to their Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Ms. Baumann did not serve or file a separate expert report applicable to 
the alleged breaches and failures by Dr. Tayler. See Rec. at 451, ,r,r 6-7; 383-81; and 
380-351. 
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380-351. The pharmacologist's report also offered the expert opinion that the 
duplicative medications prescribed by Dr. Tayler and as instructed by the Pharmacy 
caused her to suffer the injuries that ·she experienced. See id. 
It follows that, in the event that this Court reverses the District Court's 
decision to exclude the expert report filed and served by Ms. Baumann, the question 
presented for the District Court will be whether the expert report of the 
pharmacologist is sufficient to establish a dispute of material fact that precludes 
summary judgment as to the Doctor. That issue, of course, is not presented now 
before this Court. Yet, it is worth noting that the pharmacist-expert is properly 
qualified to testify as to the properties of the duplicative drugs at issue here, the 
standard of care in prescribing those drugs, and the danger of duplicative 
medications - all of which apply with equal force to the Doctor. See, e.g., Garvey 
v. O'Donoghue, 530 A.2d 1141, 1142, 1146-47 (D.C. 1987) (holding that testimony 4v 
by pharmacologist was admissible in medical malpractice action against physicians 
for negligent prescription of drugs, given that physicians rely on pharmacological 
information supplied by pharmacologists for information about dosage and proper 
prescriptions).6 Thus, the Doctor is wrong when he asserts (Dr. Br. at 19-20) that, 
6 See also, e.g., Parker v. Harper, 803 So.2d. 76, 79 (La. Ct. App. 2001) 
(holding that pharmacist could define the existence, nature, and the probability of a 
risk's occurrence in a medical practice action against a physician alleging that he 
failed to inform the plaintiff of the potential side effects and warning signs of the 
(continued ... ) 
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absent separate expert testimony as to the Doctor, Ms. Baumann cannot, as a matter 
of law, establish a prima facie claim of medical malpractice. Indeed, the question 
presented to the District Court on remand as to the Doctor's potential liability will 
va be whether, in light of the pharmacologist-expert's testimony as to a proper 
prescription and the danger of duplicative prescription, the Doctor breached the 
applicable standard of care when mistakenly prescribed the two medications. 
Considered in the context of a motion for summary judgment, it is clear that a 
reasonable jury could conclude that he did breach the applicable standard by 
6( ••• continued) 
prescribed drug); Sinkfieldv. Oh, 229 Ga. App. 883,495 S.E.2d 94, 95 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1997) (holding that expert testimony by toxicologist was admissible in medical 
malpractice action against prescribing physician concerning the scientific effect of 
the prescribed medicine); Goodman et al. v. Lipman, 197 Ga. App. 631,399 S.E.2d 
255, 256-58 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that testimony of pharmacologist was 
admissible in medical malpractice action against physician who prescribed drugs to 
establish properties of the prescribed drugs as relevant to the finder of fact; 
Thompson v. Carter, 518 So.2d 609, 615 (Miss. 1987) ("The instant record 
reflect[ed] that [the pharmacologist], who taught medical students and advised and 
counseled physicians as to drug use and administration, through his skill, knowledge, 
training, and education, knew the standard of care to which physicians adhered when 
prescribing Bactrim" and, therefore, he was qualified as an expert witness.); United 
States v. Smith, 573 F.3d 639, 653 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that pharmacologist was 
qualified to testify as to the standard of care applicable to the prescription of drugs); 
and United States v. Bek, 493 F .3d 790, 795 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that 
pharmacologist was qualified as an expert as to the standard of care applicable to the 
prescription of drugs without diagnostic tests and review of patients' medical 
histories). 
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prescribing duplicative medications with the risks enunciated by the pharmacologist-
expert, without need for additional expert testimony by a physician. See id. 7 
II. THEERRONEOUSAPPLICATIONOFRULE26(d)(4)OFTHEUTAH 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RATHER THAN RULE 16(d), TO 
THE FAILURE TO TIMELY DISCLOSE THE EXPERT REPORT. 
The Pharmacy asserts (Phann. Br. at 41-43) that the Court of Appeals acted 
properly in applying Rule 26(d)(4), rather than Rule 16(d), to Ms. Baumann's 
untimely disclosure of her expert report. The Pharmacy is mistaken. 8 
The decision of the Court of Appeals - applying Rule 26( d) rather than Rule 
16( d) to exclude an expert report that was untimely under a stipulation adopted by 
7 Put another way, a lay jury could reasonably conclude that the Doctor 
breached the applicable standard of care by prescribing duplicative medications that, 
when taken together in the quantities prescribed, posed serious risk of the very 
injuries suffered by Ms. Baumann. See, e.g., Bowman v. Kalm, 2008 UT 9, ,r,r 9-13, 
179 P.3d 754 (holding that expert testimony was not needed to establish causation 
with respect to a claim for medical malpractice where connection was within 
common knowledge oflay juror); Nixdorfv. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348,353 (Utah 1980) 
(holding that common knowledge exception applies to general requirement of expert 
testimony applies to standard of care where surgical is left in patient). 
8 Dr. Tayler contends (Dr. Br. at 13-18) that the issue whether the District 
Court acted properly in relying on Rule 26( d)( 4) does not apply to the Doctor at all. 
In support of this contention, the Doctor says ( see id.) that Ms. Baumann never 
sought to introduce a separate expert report as to the Doctor and, accordingly, the 
District Court did not actually exclude any such report in deciding the Defendants' 
joint motion for summary judgment. Yet, though the premise of this statement is a 
fair one, the conclusion does not follow. Ms. Baumann is not now arguing that the 
District Court, on remand, should consider a separate expert report that she never 
previously filed and served below. Rather, as we note above, the District Court will 
be asked to address the question whether the expert report that was submitted is 
sufficient to establish liability as to the Doctor. 
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the court-conflicts with this Court's decision in Coroles v. State, 2015 UT 48,349 
...J P.3d 739. In Coro/es, this Court held that Rule 16(d) is the source of a district 
court's authority to sanction a party for producing untimely discovery under a 
~ scheduling order. Coro/es, 2015 UT 48, 1 20 ( citing Boice ex rel. Boice v. Marble, 
1999 UT 71, ,r 8 & n. 3,982 P.2d 565 andArnoldv. Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307, 1309-10 
(Utah 1993) ). Under this Rule, this Court noted, a district court may '"establish[] the 
time to complete discovery'" through a scheduling order. Coroles, 2015 UT 48, ,r 19 
(quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 16(a)(9)). 
In light of this, it is clear that the District Court committed reversible error 
when it excluded the untimely expert witness report submitted by Ms. Baumann. 
Here, the source of the deadline for disclosure of expert reports was found not 
standard provision set forth in Rule 26, and the Notice of Event Due Dates that 
~ identified those deadlines; but, instead, in the Stipulation to which the parties agreed 
that was filed with the Court.9 Indeed, the District Court relied specifically on the 
9 This is why, contrary to the Pharmacy's contention (Phann. Br. at 41) and 
the decision of the Court of Appeals here, the decision of the Court of Appeals in 
Sleepy Holdings LLC v. Mountain West Title, 2016 UT App 62, 370 P.3d 963, is 
inapplicable here. The decision in Sleepy Holdings addressed a failure to serve 
initial disclosures under Rule 26( a)( 1 ). Bauman v. The Kroger Co., 2016 UT App 
165, ,r,r 18-19, 381 P.3d 1135. In Sleepy Holdings, the appellant argued that the 
district court abused its discretion when it excluded evidence under Rule 26 and that 
it should instead have applied the discretionary sanctions found in Rule 16( d). Id. 
~ 19. In Sleepy Holdings, the Court of Appeals explained that Rule 16 "governs 
pretrial conferences, scheduling, and management conferences," id. ,r 20, whereas 
(continued ... ) 
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Stipulation and, in so doing, adopted that deadline as the scheduling order applicable 
to the case and relied on that Stipulation as the basis of its decision to exclude ~ 
Ms. Baumann's expert report. "Although courts have discretion to sanction parties 
for violating a scheduling order, an exercise of discretion guided by an erroneous legal 
conclusion is reversible." Coro/es, 2015 UT 48, ,r 24 (reversing district court's order 
excluding untimely expert reports, because the decision was based on an application ofRule 
37(h) and not Rule 16( d)). Accordingly, it is clear that this Court should reverse the District 
Court's exclusion of the untimely expert report submitted by Ms. Baumann. See id 
Finally, as we showed in our principal Brief ( at 18-19), a decision by the District 
Court to exclude the untimely expert report under Rule 16( d) in the circumstances presented 
here would likewise be an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Coro/es, 2015 Uf 48, ,r 29 ( citing 0 
Moore's Federal Practice§ 16.92[5][c][i](3ded. 2014)and Welshv. Hosp. Corp. of Utah, 
2010 UT App 171, ,r 10,235 P.3d 791 ("Excluding a witness from testifying is ... extreme 
9( ••• continued) 
[R Jule 26 "governs initial disclosures and discovery," id. ,r 21. The Court of Appeals 
declined to apply Coro/es, as the appellant had urged, because, the Court decided, 
Coro/es does not interpret or even mention Rule 26 and because Rule 26 properly 
authorized sanctions for the failure to disclose. Id ,r 23. Therefore, the Court of 
Appeals concluded in the instant case, the District Court properly treated 
Ms. Baumann's failure to timely disclose an expert report under the parties' 
Stipulation not as a failure to make a timely disclosure under a scheduling order but 
as a failure to disclose. Baumann v. Kroger Co., 2016 UT App 165, ,r,r 18-21, 381 
P.3d 1135. Yet, as we make clear above, the source of the deadline for disclosure 
of expert reports here was found not standard provision set forth in Rule 26, and the 
Notice of Event Due Dates that identified those deadlines; but, instead, in the 
Stipulation to which the parties agreed that was filed with the Court. 
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in nature and ... should be employed only with caution and restraint."). As we stated in our 
..;) principal Brief (at 19), the factors that counsel strongly in favor of not excluding the 
untimely expert report include the fact that she was representing herself prose, that she had 
and has cognitive difficulties, 10 that there is no evidence that she intentionally missed the 
applicable deadline, 11 that the case had not been certified for trial and no trial date had been 
set, and that there could be no cognizable prejudice to the Doctor or the Pharmacy except 
for the need for a new scheduling order and delay in the eventual trial date. See Co/ores, 
2015 UT 48, ,r 28. 
10 The Pharmacy asserts (Phann. Br. at 53) that Ms. Baumann's status as a pro 
se litigant in the District Court should have no impact in resolving the issues 
presented in this appeal. Yet, as the Pharmacy notes (id), though a prose party is not 
entitled to unlimited indulgence, he or she is "entitled to every consideration that 
may be reasonably indulged." (Citing Sivuich v. Dept. of Workforce Services, 2015 
UT App 101, ,r 6, 2015 UT App LEXIS 101.) Here, in resolving this appeal, we 
cannot simply ignore the fact that Ms. Baumann was representing herself pro se in 
the District Court, had no experience at all with the applicable Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and also suffered from cognitive difficulties caused by Defendants' 
conduct. In the end, if Ms. Baumann had been represented by counsel, her attorney 
would have no doubt been cognizant of the deadline for expert disclosures, and 
would have asked for, and received from opposing counsel as a professional 
courtesy, an extension of time within which to complete those disclosures. The 
result here thus differs from the result that would have been realized had 
Ms. Baumann been represented by competent counsel. 
11 The Pharmacy asserts (Phann. Br. at 55), with no actual evidentiary 
support, that "the record shows that Ms. Baumann' s decision to not properly and 
timely designate experts and provide expert reports related to her claims against 
Smith's Pharmacy was intentional because she desired to avoid expenses and 
because she believed that the law did not require experts in this case." Yet, in 
reality, this assertion is nothing more than mere argument by the Pharmacy. Indeed, 
there is no evidence whatsoever in the record that supports such a conclusion. 
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ill. THE ERRONEOUS EXCLUSION OF THE UNTIMELY EXPERT 
REPORTUNDERRULE26(d)BASEDONLYONAFINDINGTHATTHE 
FAILURE TO DISCLOSE WAS NOT JUSTIFIED. ~ 
Smith's Phannacy contends (Phann. Br. at 56-60) that the District Court and, in tum, 
the Court of Appeals, properly applied Rule 26( d)( 4) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The Pharmacy is wrong. Even assuming for the sake of argument that Rule 26( d)( 4), and 
not Rule 16( d), should have been applied at all, it is clear that the District Court and the 
Court of Appeals each erred in its application of Rule 26( d)( 4 ). 
As we showed in our principal Brief (at 19-22), the decisions of the District Court 
and the Court of Appeals, which required only a finding under Rule 26(d)(4) of a lack of 
justification, conflicts with the plain language of Rule 26( d)( 4) and well-settled 
interpretations of that language. See, e.g., Utah R. Civ. P. 26( d)( 4) (party who fails to 
disclose may not use the material "unless the failure is hannless or the party shows good 
cause for the failure) ( emphasis added); see also, e.g., Eugene S. v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue '1,., 
Shield ofN.J., 663 F.3d 1124, 1129 (10th Cir. 2011); Trostv. Trek Bicycle Corp., 162 F.3d 
1004, 1008 (8th Cir. 1998). 
Thus, even applying rule 26( d)( 4 ), the District Court should have considered whether 
the failure to disclose was hannless, based on the plain language of the Rule. See, e.g., 
Coro/es, 2015 UT 48, if 29 ( stating that the district court should exercise restraint in deciding 
to exclude an expert where exclusion is tantamount to dismissal of the lawsuit). And, as we 
made clear in our principal Brief (at 23-24), if the District Court had done so, the District 
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Court could not have properlyl excluded the untimely expert report submitted by 
Ms. Baumann .. See Co/ores, 2015 UT 48,128. This result, as we also made clear in our 
principal Brief (at 24), is in keeping with this Court's "general judicial policy that favors a 
,.J trial on the merits when there is some doubt as to the propriety of a summary judgment." 
King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 832 P.2d 858, 865 (Utah 1992) (citation omitted). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons and for the reasons set forth in our principal 
Memorandum, the Court should vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals, vacate the 
judgment entered by the District Court, and remand this case with instructions to the District 
Court, consistent with this Court's opinion. 
Respectfully submitted this 1st day of February 2017: 
~~ 
Gregory W. Stevens 
Attorney for Appellant 
Kari L. Baumann 
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